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RRX INDUSTRIES, INC. v. LAB-CON, INC.: IS THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S INCONSEQUENTIAL TREATMENT
OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
LIMITATIONS UNDER U.C.C.
§ 2-719 UNCONSCIONABLE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has been de-
scribed as "one of those rare statutes which has been drafted by a self-
conscious jurisprude."' The appropriateness of such a description is evi-
dent when one examines UCC section 2-719, the Article's provision re-
garding limitations of remedies.
Section 2-719 of the UCC allows contracting parties the freedom to
shape or limit remedies to the parties' particular requirements provided
they meet the standards set forth in section 2-719.2 Specifically, the pro-
vision states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limita-
tion of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition
to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may
limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this
Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement
of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is
the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited rem-
edy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as pro-
vided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
1. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 621, 621 (1975).
2. U.C.C. § 2-719 and official comments (1978).
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damages where the loss is commercial is not.
In RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.,4 the Ninth Circuit held
that the limited remedy negotiated between RRX and Lab-Con had
failed of its essential purpose' under subsection (2) of section 2-719.6
Further, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of conse-
quential damages notwithstanding the parties' contractual provision ex-
cluding such damages.7
This Note examines the failure of limited remedy provisions and the
effect that failure has on consequential damages limitations. Specifically,
the issue can be phrased as follows: When a limited repair or replace
remedy fails of its essential purpose pursuant to section 2-719 of the
UCC, what effect, if any, does that failure have on a consequential dam-
ages limitation?
At one time, the Ninth Circuit held consequential damages limita-
tions enforceable notwithstanding a failure of a limited remedy, unless
the breach of the seller (failure to fulfill the limited remedy) was so total
and fundamental as to require that the limitation be expunged from the
contract.8 Arguably, this meant that when the seller willfully refused to
repair or replace the defective goods, causing the limited remedy to fail of
its essential purpose, the court could render the consequential damages
limitation unenforceable. However, in RRX, and other recent decisions,
the court of appeals appears to be retreating from its earlier approach in
favor of a more stringent approach which invalidates consequential dam-
3. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978). The Ninth Circuit applied § 2719 of the California Commer-
cial Code in RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc. For the purpose of this Note, however, refer-
ence will be made to § 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), except when quoting
the Ninth Circuit's RRX opinion. The two sections are virtually identical in wording and
intent and, in the context of this Note, the minor differences are irrelevant. For the minor
differences, see CAL. COM. CODE § 2719 (West Supp. 1985).
4. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
5. The UCC offers no precise definition of "essential purpose." However, the official
comments to § 2-719(2) state that "under subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reason-
able clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of
the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this
Article." U.C.C. § 2-719 official comment 1 (1978).
6. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
7. Id. The UCC defines consequential damages as follows:
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss result-
ing from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time
of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by
cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1978).
8. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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ages limitations whenever the limited remedy fails of its essential
purpose.
This Note proposes that the Ninth Circuit, as well as all courts,
adopt a mid-line approach to this section 2-719 problem. Specifically,
this Note suggests that when a seller willfully refuses to repair or replace
defective goods, thus causing the limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, courts should render the consequential damages limitation un-
enforceable. However, if the seller attempts to repair or replace the
goods but is unable to do so, courts should uphold the consequential
damages limitation as valid, notwithstanding the failure of the limited
remedy.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The controversy in RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.9 arose
from a computer software contract entered into between Lab-Con, Inc.
(Lab-Con) and RRX Industries, Inc. (RRX).'° Pursuant to the contract,
Lab-Con agreed to provide RRX with a computer software system for
use in its medical laboratory." Lab-Con also agreed to correct any mal-
functions that arose in the system, but limited its overall liability to the
contract price.' 2 Specifically, the contract provision read as follows:
4. [Lab-Con] warrants that the software shall be free of pro-
gramming "bugs" for the term of the license, and that [Lab-
Con] shall correct any such programming "bugs" (whether dis-
covered by [Lab-Con], User [RRX] or others) at no cost to
User. The liability of [Lab-Con] under this warranty, or under
other warranty expressed or implied, shall be limited in amount
to $52,300.00, or such lesser sum that shall have actually been
paid by User to [Lab-Con] pursuant to Paragraph 5 of this
Agreement. 1
3
9. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
10. Lab-Con was a successor corporation to Thomas E. Kelly and Associates (TEKA).
TEKA was the original contracting party with RRX; when Lab-Con was formed, TEKA
assigned the RRX contract to Lab-Con. Id. at 545.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brief for Appellants at 22, RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1985). Although § 2-719(b) provides that resort to a limited remedy is optional unless ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive, courts usually do not confront this issue in analyzing § 2-719.
As long as the contract provision limits the remedy in some form, courts generally construe
the remedy to be exclusive. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635
F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). In Chatlos, although the contract provision did not state that the
remedy was "exclusive," the court assumed arguendo that it satisfied § 2-719(b) because it
stated that the seller's liability was "limited." Id. at 1085. See also AES Technology Sys., Inc.
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Lab-Con began installing the software system in January, 1981, and
completed work in June of that year.14 Soon after the installation, cer-
tain "bugs" or malfunctions appeared in the system. 5 Although Lab-
Con attempted to correct the "bugs" by means of telephone patching,1
6
these corrections were short lived. In March, 1982, Lab-Con upgraded
RRX's system making it compatible with more sophisticated hardware.' 7
However, persistent malfunctioning in the system eventually rendered
the entire system unreliable.'
8
In September 1982, RRX filed suit alleging breach of contract and
fraud 9 against Lab-Con, Inc., as well as Lab-Con's corporate predeces-
sor and founder.2 ° Despite the contract provision limiting damages,
21
RRX claimed damages in excess of $500,000.22
Following a bench trial, the district court found that Lab-Con had
materially breached the contract. 23 The court reasoned that Lab-Con
had prevented RRX from receiving the consideration for which it had
bargained-namely, "a bug-free, well maintained, complete laboratory
software system, that would permit it to reliably and efficiently automate
its laboratory."24
However, the district court found for Lab-Con on the issue of
fraud.25 In doing so, the court relied on the fact that Lab-Con's loss of
two key personnel prevented them from carrying out their contractual
obligations.26 The court concluded that at the time Lab-Con made repre-
v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978). In AES, although the parties' contract
did not contain an express provision excluding consequential damages, the court found such a
condition to be implicit in the fact that the repair and replace warranty was expressly exclu-
sive. Id. at 941 n.9.
14. RRX, 772 F.2d at 545.
15. Id.
16. Id. Telephone patching is a method of computer software correction done over the
telephone. In this case, Thomas E. Kelly issued instructions over the telephone to an RRX
employee who entered the information into RRX's computer system. Id. at 545 n. 1.
17. Id. at 545.
18. Id. RRX, however, continued to use the system throughout the end of 1981 and into
the spring of 1982. Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 3.
19. Lab-Con filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract and fraud. However, the
district court found that RRX did not breach its contract by failing to make its final payment
on the purchase price because Lab-Con's previous breach excused RRX's performance. Fur-
ther, the court found that RRX had made no fraudulent representations. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 10-11, RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
20. See supra note 10.
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 4.
23. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 19, at 3-6.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id.
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sentations to RRX the company could not have anticipated the depar-
ture of these employees. Further, the district court held that at the time
the agreement was consummated, the representations made were within
Lab-Con's capacity to execute.2 7 The court reasoned, however, that Lab-
Con's loss of key personnel after entering into the contract left the com-
pany understaffed and deficient in cash flow, thus resulting in the
breach.28
As a remedy for Lab-Con's breach, the district court rescinded the
contract and awarded RRX $40,866.66, the sum paid by RRX to Lab-
Con for the system.29 Further, the court refused to enforce the contract
provision limiting damages, finding the limited remedies to have failed of
their essential purpose.30 The court concluded that "since defendants
were either unwilling or unable to provide a system that worked as repre-
sented, or to fix the 'bugs' in the software, these limited remedies failed of
their essential purpose, and plaintiff is entitled to recover all of its dam-
ages.",31 Hence, the court awarded consequential damages to plaintiff to-
talling $7,456.39.32
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rul-
ing in its entirety.33 Judge Norris, while concurring in the majority's
finding of a breach of contract, dissented in the majority's award of con-
sequential damages.34
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
On appeal, Lab-Con challenged the district court's award of conse-
quential damages to RRX.35 The district court had utilized the Califor-
27. Id. at 9-10.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id.
32. The court awarded consequential damages in the following amounts: (1) $6,314 for
employee overtime and executive time spent by RRX in attempting to solve the problems
caused by Lab-Con's breach of contract and (2) $1,142.39 for additional costs, including tele-
phone expenses, incurred by RRX in making numerous attempts to contact Lab-Con for cor-
rective maintenance. Id. at 9.
33. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
34. Id. at 547-48 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1985). On appeal,
Lab-Con also asserted several alternate grounds for reversing the lower court's decision. First,
Lab-Con argued that the district court erred in crediting the testimony of three RRX wit-
nesses. Id. at 545. However, the Ninth Circuit stated that it "afford[ed] considerable defer-
ence to district court findings on credibility" and that the "challenged testimony [was] not so
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nia Commercial Code (Code) in awarding consequential damages.3 6 The
Ninth Circuit stated that reliance on the Code was proper only if the
computer system could be considered a "good" rather than a service.37
In making this determination, the appellate court stated that it must
"look to the essence of the agreement" to determine whether the contract
involved the sale of goods or services.38 The court concluded that the
contract between RRX and Lab-Con predominantly involved the sale of
goods-the computer software system.39 The court stated that the em-
ployee training, repair services and system upgrading were incidental to
the sale of the system and thus did not defeat the characterization of the
system as a "good."4
inconsistent that a fact finder would not credit it." Id. Further, the court of appeals found
corroborative testimony by other witnesses that supported the district court's findings. Id.
Second, the defendants argued that because Kelly was not found to have acted in bad
faith, the district court's determination that Kelly was the alter ego of TEKA was erroneous.
Id. at 546. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with appellants' argument, holding that under Califor-
nia law a finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite to the application of the alter ego doctrine.
Id. Further, the court stated that the record supported the district court's application of the
alter ego doctrine because the requisite unity of interest and ownership existed in Kelly's exer-
tion of total control over TEKA. Id. at 545-46. The defendants also argued that it was errone-
ous for the district court to hold that TEKA was undercapitalized because TEKA had $8,000
in its corporate account. Id. at 546. However, the Ninth Circuit found that that fact alone
was not sufficient to defeat a finding of undercapitalization. Id. Thus, the court concluded
that the district court did not err by imposing liability on Kelly. Id.
Third, defendants argued that the district court erred in imposing liability on Lab-Con
since TEKA was the original contracting party. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that
following TEKA's transfer of all its software and licenses to Lab-Con for no consideration,
"TEKA was simply an empty shell, which the district court properly disregarded." Id.
Finally, defendants argued that the district court's finding of breach of contract was erro-
neous because RRX had also breached the contract by failing to pay the remaining payments
for the computer. Id. According to the court of appeals, however, that contention clearly
lacked merit. Id. It reasoned that Lab-Con contracted to timely install an operational
software system, repair malfunctions and train RRX employees. Because the record reflected
that (1) the software never functioned as intended, (2) Lab-Con failed to repair the malfunc-
tions in the system, and (3) Lab-Con did not sufficiently train RRX employees, the appellate
court concluded that the evidence supported the district court's finding of a breach of contract.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly found that RRX did not
breach the contract by failing to make its final payment because Lab-Con's breach excused
RRX's performance. Id.
36. Id. at 546-47.
37. Id. at 546. Article 2 of the UCC and Division 2 of the California Commercial Code
(Code) cover the sale of goods. The UCC and the Code define goods as "all things (including
specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities ... and
things in action. . . ." U.C.C. § 2-105 (1978); CAL. COM. CODE § 2105 (West 1964).
38. RRX, 772 F.2d at 546. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven
Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 580 n.6 (7th Cir. 1976).
39. RRX, 772 F.2d at 546..
40. Id. See also Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
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Section 2-719(2) of the UCC states that "[w]here circumstances
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem-
edy may be had as provided in this Act. '4 1 Interpreting this provision to
mean that all remedies may be had (including consequential damages),
the district court awarded RRX consequential damages in the amount of
$7,456.39.42 Lab-Con argued that this award was improper because the
contract limited damages to the amount paid under the contract.43 How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit, quoting the district court, disagreed: "'since the
defendants were either unwilling or unable to provide a system that
worked as represented, or to fix the "bugs" in the software, these limited
remedies failed of their essential purpose .... "'
Moreover, the court of appeals reasoned that the district court's
award of consequential damages was consistent with its earlier deci-
sions. In S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith International, Inc.,4 6 the Ninth
Circuit held that the failure of a limited repair remedy does not require a
court to allow the recovery of consequential damages unless the breach is
so total and fundamental as to require that the consequential damages
limitation be expunged from the contract.47 In RRX, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the district court "properly found the default of the seller so
total and fundamental that its consequential damages limitation was ex-
punged from the contract.
'48
The majority in RRX also relied on two recent Ninth Circuit cases,
Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America49 and Fiorito Bros. v.
1980); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572 (7th
Cir. 1976).
41. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
42. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 19, at 9.
43. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
44. Id. (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit)(quoting Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law at 19, RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (1985)). By adding emphasis
to the district court's finding, the Ninth Circuit obviously was inferring that both the repair
remedy and the consequential damages limitation failed of their essential purpose. However, it
is extremely important to note that no court has ever held a consequential damages limitation
to fail of its essential purpose. Further, according to subsection (3) of § 2-719, the only test for
the validity of a consequential damages limitation is unconscionability, not failure of essential
purpose. Thus, in RRX, either the district court took an extremely novel approach in address-
ing the § 2-719 issue, or the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the district court's finding is quite
unique or simply erroneous.
45. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
46. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. Id. at 1375.
48. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547. The court offered no reasoning for this conclusion. Further,
nowhere in the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did it even make such
a finding.
49. 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:181
Fruehauf Corp.,5  in upholding the award of consequential damages.5 I
The gist of these two cases, and Wilson, is that each case must be judged
on its own facts, enabling courts to give effect to the parties' intentions
regarding risk allocation. 2 The RRX court went on to state that the
facts in RRX justified the district court's ruling, including its award of
consequential damages. 3
B. The Dissent
Although Judge Norris concurred with the majority's holding that
Lab-Con breached its contract, he dissented as to the award of conse-
quential and incidental damages. 4 He began his dissent by analyzing the
provision of the contract which discussed the obligations and potential
liabilities of the parties.5" Judge Norris stated that he saw no legitimate
reason to ignore the bargain struck by the parties.56 Under the terms of
the contract, Lab-Con agreed to repair any malfunctions that arose in the
system, but the parties agreed that Lab-Con's liability for consequential
damages for failure to correct the bugs would not exceed the contract
price.57
50. 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
51. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547. In Milgard, the Ninth Circuit held that a consequential dam-
ages limitation did not justify summary judgment for the seller when the limited repair and
replace remedy had failed of its essential purpose. Milgard, 761 F.2d at 557. The court re-
manded the case to the district court for an examination of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the breach. Id. In Fiorito, the court held that a dump truck body manufacturer's
limited repair or replace remedy failed of its essential purpose rendering the consequential
damages limitation unenforceable. The Ninth Circuit stated that the best way of approaching
§ 2-719 cases is to undertake a case-by-case analysis, with each case and contract judged on its
own merits. This way, the court reasoned, courts would be better able to "give effect to the
parties' intentions regarding risk allocation and will lead less frequently to unjust results."
Fiorito, 747 F.2d at 1314-15.
52. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
53. Id. The majority's entire discussion relating to the validity of the consequential dam-
ages limitation consisted of six brief paragraphs, covering three-quarters of a page, while the
dissent's opinion covered five pages. This fact is noted for two reasons. First, it explains why
this Note's analysis of the majority's reasoning is much shorter than the analysis of the dis-
sent's reasoning. Second, it emphasizes the majority's shortshrifted treatment of the § 2-719
issue in RRX.
54. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority did not distinguish between conse-
quential and incidental damages, but referred only to consequential damages. For the purpose
of this Note, the distinction between the two terms is irrelevant and thus this Note will refer
only to consequential damages. See UCC § 2-715 for the distinction.
55. RRX, 772 F.2d at 548 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
56. RRX, 772 F.2d at 548 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Judge Norris asserted that RRX agreed to bear the risk of a possible
breach which resulted in consequential damages:
Lab-Con and RRX were both sophisticated commercial enter-
prises bargaining at arms length. The limitation on conse-
quential damages, viewed ex ante, seems to be a reasonable
accommodation of interests. There is no suggestion that Lab-
Con acted in bad faitht581 in failing to repair the "bugs." The
district court found that Lab-Con's failure to make repairs was
not deliberate but resulted from the loss of two key [Lab-Con]
employees. There is no suggestion that the contract was uncon-
scionablet591 in any respect. Therefore, there is simply no good
reason for the court to intrude on the bargaining process by
shifting to Lab-Con the risk of RRX's loss in excess of the con-
tract price.60
Judge Norris noted that section 2719 of the California Commercial
Code6' allows parties to contract for alternative remedies in lieu of the
Code or to limit the amount of damages, or to do both, as did RRX and
Lab-Con in their contract.62 Judge Norris agreed with the majority's
finding that the repair remedy failed of its essential purpose because Lab-
Con was incapable of keeping the computer system free of "bugs.,
63
However, he then went on to conclude that a finding that the repair rem-
edy failed of its essential purpose should not automatically render the
consequential damages limitation unenforceable.64
58. Although the UCC does not define "bad faith," it does define "good faith." In the case
of a merchant, the UCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103 (1978). Presumably,
anything not done in "good faith" would constitute "bad faith."
59. "Unconscionability" has been defined as absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The
official comment to UCC § 2-302 (entitled "Unconscionable Contract or Clause") states that
"[t]he principle [of unconscionability] is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair sur-
prise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."
U.C.C. § 2-302 official comment 1 (1978).
60. RRX, 772 F.2d at 548 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes
added) (citations omitted).
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
62. RRX, 772 F.2d at 548-49 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 549 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even the case relied upon by
the majority expounds this view. In S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th
Cir. 1978), the court stated that "[t]he failure of the limited repair warranty to achieve its
essential purpose makes available ... the remedies as 'may be had as provided in this code.'
[But] [t]his does not mean ... that the bar to recovery of consequential damages should be
eliminated." Id. at 1375. For a full discussion of Wilson, see infra notes 136-42 and accompa-
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According to Judge Norris, the majority ignored the fundamental
goal of section 2719, which is to allow parties the freedom to limit or
alter their remedies and to allocate business risks as appropriate." The
majority erroneously assumed that a buyer could resort to all remedies in
the Code once a contract failed of its essential purpose under section
2719(2).66 Judge Norris relied on the comments to section 2719 to sup-
port his conclusion:
[I]t is the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to con-
clude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept
the legal consequence that there must be at least a fair quantum
of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the
contract.67
Judge Norris concluded that "[c]onsequential damages go beyond 'mini-
mum adequate remedies.' "68
Judge Norris also noted that a contract price may vary depending
on which party assumes the risk of consequential damages. 9 If a seller
and a buyer negotiate a contract whereby the buyer obtains a lower con-
tract price in return for a limitation on the seller's potential consequent-
ial damages liability, is not the buyer receiving a windfall when a court
nying text. See also Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co.,
709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983) (in the absence of unconscionability, a consequential damages
exclusion is enforceable, notwithstanding a failure of the limited remedy); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (failure of a limited remedy does
not automatically invalidate a consequential damages limitation; unless unconscionable, the
limitation should stand).
65. RRX, 772 F.2d at 549 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-719
official comment 1 (1978)).
68. RRX, 772 F.2d at 549 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Mini-
mum adequate remedies, in this case, would have been damages measured as the difference
between the value of the goods as warranted and the value of what was received, without the
award of consequential damages. See generally U.C.C. § 2-713 (1978),
69. RRX, 772 F.2d at 550 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Norris offered the following hypothetical to support his proposition:
Assume, for example, that a Fortune 500 company offers a contract to a small com-
pany, such as Lab-Con. Although the contract could be profitable for the small com-
pany, the prospect of liability for the large company's lost profits or good will that
might result from an interruption in operations caused by faulty software could be
staggering. The stakes could be far too high for a small software company. Being
much larger, and capable of diversifying its risk, the large company should be free to
bargain for a lower price in exchange for its agreement to limit the seller's conse-
quential damages.
Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). Judge Norris
stated that this principle should be applied even when there is no significant difference in the
size of the buyer and seller. Id. at 550 n.4.
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ignores the damages limitation? The buyer gets more than he or she bar-
gained for while the seller suffers a double loss, receiving less than mar-
ket price for the goods and paying full damages.
Norris stated that California law recognizes this business reality and
cited Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.7° to support his prem-
ise.71 In Delta Airlines the court upheld an airplane manufacturer's ex-
culpatory clause72 against the airline's claim for damages and reasoned as
follows:
Under the contract before us, Delta ... bears that risk [of eco-
nomic loss] in return for a purchase price acceptable to it; had
the clause been removed, the risk would have fallen on Douglas
... but in return for an increased price deemed adequate by it
to compensate for the risk assumed. We can see no reason why
Delta, having determined, as a matter of business judgment,
that the price fixed justified assuming the risk of loss, should
now be allowed to shift the risk so assumed to Douglas, which
had neither agreed to assume it nor been compensated for such
assumption.73
Judge Norris argued that, in a particular transaction, a limitation on
consequential damages might be necessary to create a bargain and that
70. 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
71. RRX, 772 F.2d at 550 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. The exculpatory clause read, in pertinent part, as follows:
The extent of Seller's liability under this warranty as to defects in material or
workmanship, and defects arising from the selection of material or the process of
manufacture, is limited to the repair of such defects in the aircraft or to the repair or
replacement ... of any accessory, equipment or part which is defective in any such
respects.
Delta Airlines, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 98, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
73. Id. at 104-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (footnote omitted). The Delta court emphasized the
equality of bargaining power between the plaintiff, Delta Airlines, and the defendant, Douglas
Aircraft.
It is clear from the record that Delta, one of the major airlines of the nation,
with the aid of a staff of experienced executives and attorneys, had negotiated a con-
tract with terms individual to Douglas. There is not, nor can there be, any doubt
that Delta knew that the exculpatory clause was in the contract, and that it volunta-
rily agreed to it. It is suggested that the contract took on an element of a "contract
of adhesion" in that the clause was part of Douglas' standard form. But the clause
clearly was open to negotiation, and Delta was free to seek another airplane from
another manufacturer on terms which... would not have included such a clause.
Id. at 102-03, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (footnote omitted).
In RRX, both parties contributed to the formation of the contract. Lab-Con provided a
standard form which RRX added to by amendment and with additional documents. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 19, at 2. Thus, it appears that had RRX been
dissatisfied with the terms of the contract, specifically the limitation on damages provision, it
could have renegotiated or amended the contract to suit its business needs.
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such a limitation becomes a part of the value of the bargain.74 To sup-
port his proposition Judge Norris resorted again to the official comments
of section 2-719: "[U]nder subsection (2), where an apparently fair and
reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or oper-
ates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must
give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article."75 A limita-
tion on consequential damages, Judge Norris reasoned, does no violence
to the "substantial value of the bargain," unlike a limitation on damages
for the difference between the value of what was received and what was
expected.76
Judge Norris further noted that subsection (3) of section 271977 gov-
erns the limitations of consequential damages.78 Subsection (3) allows
parties to limit or exclude consequential damages unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. 79 Because neither RRX nor the majority
suggested that the limitation on consequential damages was unconsciona-
ble, Judge Norris implicitly asserted that the provision should be allowed
to stand with full force and effect. 80
Quoting official comment 1 to UCC section 2-719, which states that
"any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this
Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion and in that
event the remedies made available by this Article are applicable as if the
74. RRX, 772 F.2d at 550 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citing
U.C.C. § 2-719 official comment 1 (1978); CAL. COM. CODE § 2719 comment 2 (West 1964)).
76. RRX, 772 F.2d at 550 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Section 2719(3) of the California Commercial Code reads as follows:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in
the case of consumer goods is invalid unless it is proved that the limitation is not
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages where the loss is commercial
is valid unless it is proved that the limitation is unconscionable.
CAL. COM. CODE § 2719(3) (West Supp. 1985). For a definition of unconscionability, see
supra note 59.
78. RRX, 772 F.2d at 550-51 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Norris argued that statutory construction compels the conclusion that subsection (3) of § 2-
719 governs consequential damages. If subsection (3) did not have specific language regarding
the issue of consequential damages, the general language of subsection (2) would determine the
validity of consequential damage provisions. However, Judge Norris reasoned that the priority
of specific over general provisions is a basic principle of statutory construction, and thus sub-
section (3) controls the validity of consequential damages limitations or exclusions. Id. at 551
n.5. See, e.g., Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 384 F.2d 126, 129
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950).
79. CAL. COM. CODE § 2719(3) (West Supp. 1985).
80. RRX, 772 F.2d at 551 & n.6 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
RRX INDUSTRIES, INC.
stricken clause had never existed,""1 Judge. Norris asserted that the
"negative implication is that the drafters of § 2-719 did not envision any
basis for invalidating limitations on consequential damages other than
unconscionability. ' s2 Judge Norris went on to quote the California ver-
sion of section 2-719, which specifies that the "[limitation of consequent-
ial damages where the loss is commercial is valid unless it is proved that
the limitation is unconscionable.
'8 3
Judge Norris next questioned the majority's reliance on S.M. Wilson
& Co. v. Smith International, Inc.,8" a 1978 Ninth Circuit decision which
applied California law to a breach of contract case. 5 Norris stated that
he could not reconcile Wilson with the facts in RRX.86 In Wilson, the
court enforced a limitation on damages provision, notwithstanding the
failure of the repair remedy. The Wilson court held that "[t]he failure of
the limited repair warranty to achieve its essential purpose makes avail-
able ... the remedies as 'may be had as provided in the code.' [But]
[t]his does not mean ... that the bar to recovery of consequential dam-
ages should be eliminated."
8 7
In so holding, the Wilson court stated that it was heavily influenced
by the characteristics of the contract between the parties. The court rea-
soned that the parties were of relatively equal bargaining power and had
allocated risks of loss to fit their business needs. The risk of consequent-
ial damages was assigned to the buyer, Wilson. When the complex
machine proved defective, the seller, Smith, did not ignore its obligation
to repair, but simply was unable to do so. The court concluded that
under this particular factual setting the seller should not have to absorb
the risk of loss which had been clearly assigned to the buyer. The con-
tract was freely negotiated and the court was not going to engage in "so-
81. U.C.C. § 2-719 official comment 1 (1978).
82. RRX, 772 F.2d at 551 n.6 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing CAL. COM. CODE
§ 2719 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
84. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978). In Wilson, the seller of a tunnel boring machine war-
ranted the machine to be free of defects in material and workmanship under normal use and
service and disclaimed all other express or implied warranties. The seller limited its liability to
replacing or repairing any defective parts of the machine that the seller manufactured. The
court held that the fact that the seller was unable to repair the machine did not open up other
remedies available under the UCC, including the recovery of consequential damages. (Wilson
stipulated that he suffered no damages other than consequential.) Id. at 1366-69.
85. RRX, 772 F.2d at 551 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
other two cases relied upon by the majority, Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of
America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985) and Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d
1309 (9th Cir. 1984), were Ninth Circuit cases in which Washington state law was applied.
86. RRX, 772 F.2d at 551 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Wilson, 587 F.2d at 1375.
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cially expensive risk shifting." The court further reasoned that the
seller's breach was "not so total and fundamental as to require that its
consequential damage limitation be expunged from the contract."8'
Judge Norris asserted that Wilson is "clear authority" for the propo-
sition that a failure of a repair remedy does not render a limitation on
consequential damages automatically invalid. 9 Because the limitation in
Wilson was not found to be unconscionable and no one claimed uncon-
scionability in RRX, Judge Norris was unable to reconcile the majority's
position in RRX with the court's prior holding in Wilson.90 Judge Norris
stated that the majority's entire attempt to distinguish Wilson consisted
of an extremely ambiguous paragraph9 1 from which he could decipher no
distinguishing legal principle.92
Nor could Judge Norris understand the majority's "expansive read-
ing of subsection (2) [of 2-719] that allows RRX to receive more than the
value of its bargain in the absence of a determination that the contract
limitation was unconscionable." 93 According to Judge Norris, the RRX
majority creates more confusion than help for parties attempting to util-
ize provisions limiting consequential damages: "The opinion provides
no basis for predicting with confidence when a bargained-for cap on con-
sequential damages will be judicially enforced." 94
Judge Norris concluded by stating that the majority's broad inter-
pretation of subsection (2) of section 2-719 undermines parties' freedom
to bargain and offers no "moorings" for negotiating risk allocation in
regard to consequential damages.95
IV. ANALYSIS
Subsection 2-719(1)(a) of the UCC allows parties to "limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article" subject to the
88. Id.
89. RRX, 772 F.2d at 551 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. The paragraph to which Judge Norris referred simply provided as follows:
The district court's award of consequential damages is consistent with S.M. Wil-
son. The court concluded that "since the defendants were either unwilling or unable
to provide a system that worked as represented, or to fix the 'bugs' in the software,
these limited remedies failed of their essential purpose .. " (emphasis added). This
is a finding that both limited remedies failed of their essential purpose. The trial
judge did not state that because the repair remedy failed, the limitation of damages
provisions should not be enforced.
Id. at 552 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. (Norris, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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limitations contained in subsections (2) and (3) of that section.96 The
purpose of this provision is to provide parties the freedom to shape their
remedies without allowing egregious and unfair terms by parties who
have an upper hand in the bargaining process. 97 If a limited or exclusive
remedy fails of its essential purpose,9" then pursuant to section 2-719(2)
the aggrieved party may resort to the remedies that are provided for in
the UCC.99
A. Failure of Essential Purpose
There is no definitive rule which enables courts to determine when a
limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose. Rather, courts utilize a
case-by-case approach, especially since the facts relating to a particular
"failure" are unique in every case.
1. Seller's unintentional inability to repair
A common failure of a limited remedy occurs when a seller uninten-
tionally fails to comply with the limited remedy. S.M. Wilson & Co. v.
Smith International, Inc. 1 o clearly illustrates this type of failure. In Wil-
son, the seller of a tunnel boring machine limited its liability to replacing
or repairing, free of charge, any defective part of the machine. When
several machine parts proved defective the seller attempted to repair/
replace them but was unable to do so. 10 1 As a result, the buyer lost a
substantial benefit of his bargain-a working machine, free from defect.
Thus, the court held that the seller's inability to cure the defects indi-
cated that the limited remedy had failed of its essential purpose."'
Many limited remedies involve sellers agreeing to repair or replace the
goods involved and many "failures" of those limited remedies involve
96. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
97. Official comment 1 to section 2-719 reads:
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies
be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article
they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of rem-
edy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract. Thus any clause
purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this Article in an uncon-
scionable manner is subject to deletion and in that event the remedies made available
by this Article are applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed.
U.C.C. § 2-719 official comment 1 (1978).
98. The most common type of failure of a limited or exclusive remedy occurs when the
party responsible for providing the remedy is either unable or unwilling to perform its obliga-
tions. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
99. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
100. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
101. Id. at 1366-68.
102. Id. at 1375.
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sellers' unintentional inability to do so. 103
2. Seller's willful refusal to repair
Failures of limited remedies also occur when a seller willfully re-
fuses to comply with the limited remedy. For example, in Fiorito Bros. v.
Fruehauf Corp. 1o the court found that Fruehauf, the seller, "arbitrarily"
declined to make necessary repairs of dump truck bodies improperly
manufactured and "arbitrarily and unreasonably declined to live up to its
contractual promises."1 °5 Thus, the court held that the limited repair
remedy failed of its essential purpose. 
10 6
The distinction between the seller's unintentional inability to repair
and the seller's willful refusal to repair is extremely important. As will
be discussed below, 1 7 this distinction could resolve many difficulties that
courts presently confront in applying section 2-719. Specifically, if courts
would focus more on the particular characteristics of the failure, i.e.,
willful versus unintentional, it could help the courts decide what effect
that failure should have on a consequential damages limitation or exclu-
sion. However, courts generally focus more on the fact that there has
been a failure, rather than on the particular characteristics of that failure.
Unfortunately, this focus has lead to a barrage of differing opinions con-
cerning section 2-719.18
B. The Effect of a Failure of a Limited Remedy on a
Consequential Damages Limitation and the Courts' Two
Extreme Approaches
1. Failure of a limited remedy automatically renders a consequential
damages limitation unenforceable
Generally, courts have followed two extremely different approaches
in addressing the problem of a limited remedy failure and its effect on a
consequential damages limitation. One approach suggests that once a
limited or exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose, the ag-
grieved party (usually the buyer) may resort to all of the remedies for
breach offered by the UCC'0 9 without regard to the other limitations
103. See, e.g., Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1985); Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427
(6th Cir. 1983).
104. 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 1313.
106. Id.
107. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 110 and accompanying text & note 121 and accompanying text.
109. Buyer's remedies can be found in UCC §§ 2-711, 2-712, 2-713, 2-714, 2-715 and 2-716.
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contained in the contract."' This reasoning can arguably be supported
by a literal reading of section 2-719(2)."' According to subsection (2),
when an exclusive or limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, the
aggrieved party may seek remedies as are provided for in the UCC.
This literal approach to section 2-719 was taken by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Soo Line Railroad v. Fruehauf Corp. "2 There, the court stated
that "the fundamental intent of section 2-719(2) reflects that a remedial
limitation's failure of essential purpose makes available all contractual
remedies, including consequential damages authorized pursuant to sec-
tions 2-714 and 2-715."' 1 Further, the Fruehauf court reasoned that
since a buyer does not anticipate (when entering into a contract) that a
limited or sole remedy will fail, thereby causing consequential damages,
all damages should be recoverable."
14
Similarly, the court in Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp. I"
reasoned that even though the seller properly limited its liability to repair
or replace, the buyer was also entitled to expect that the seller would not
repudiate its warranty to repair." 6 Further, the Birdsboro court noted
that it was the specific breach of the warranty to repair that caused the
buyer the bulk of its damages.lI" In allowing consequential damages, the
court reasoned that a seller should not be allowed "to shelter itself be-
hind one segment of the warranty when it has allegedly repudiated and
ignored its very limited obligations under another segment of the same
warranty .. .
The approach of these courts is to treat the limited or exclusive rem-
edy and the consequential damages provision as being so inextricably in-
tertwined that the failure of one automatically leads to the failure of the
other.' I" Whether this is the approach intended by the drafters of section
2-719 is highly debatable, especially since the drafters provided a sepa-
110. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985);
Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 547 F. 2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971);
Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Jones & McKnight Corp. v.
Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d
388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
111. 3 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-719:03, at 450 (1982).
112. 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 1373.
114. Id.
115. 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
116. Id. at 43-44.
117. Id. at 43.
118. Id.
119. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 111, § 2-719:03, at 450.
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rate and specific subsection allowing for the limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages.
1 20
2. A consequential damages limitation is always enforceable unless
found to be unconscionable
The other approach to this section 2-719 issue can be found in a
second line of decisions'21 which holds that a limited remedy is in-
dependent of the provision excluding or limiting consequential damages
and that a failure of the limited remedy does not automatically destroy
the other contractual provisions, such as a limitation on consequential
damages. This line of reasoning depends on a liberal reading of section
2-719, such as that offered by the court in County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis
Welding & Engineering Corp. :122
Plaintiff would have UCC 2-719 read in such a fashion as to
result in all limitations whatsoever being stricken in any event
in which an exclusive remedy should fail of its essential pur-
pose. A better reading is that the exclusive remedy clause
should be ignored; other clauses limiting remedies in less dras-
tic manners and on different theories would be left to stand or
fall independently of the stricken clause. Since the clause ex-
cluding consequential damages has been held not unconsciona-
ble, and is not otherwise offensive, it will be applied.' 23
This liberal view has also been adopted by several other circuits.
For example, in Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable &
Cold Storage Co.,124 the Sixth Circuit held that unless a limitation on
consequential damages is found to be unconscionable, it will be enforcea-
ble notwithstanding a failure of a limited remedy.I25 The court based its
decision on two grounds. First, it stated that subsection (3) of section 2-
719 governed the issue of limitations on consequential damages:
[I]t should ... be noted that, absent the specific language of
subsection (3), the general language of subsection (2) would...
120. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
121. See Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d
427 (6th Cir. 1983); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980); AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978); V-M
Corp. v. Bernhard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1971); American Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis
Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.
1971).
122. 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971).
123. Id. at 1309.
124. 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983).
125. Id. at 434-36.
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cover the issue of consequential damages. Since it is a basic
principle of statutory construction that the particular governs
over the general, we believe that the section 2-719 drafters in-
tended subsection (3) to deal with the issue of consequential
damages. 126
Second, the court concluded that the content of subsections (2) and
(3) were substantially different.127 Subsection (2) applies to the failure of
the essential purpose of limited remedies and subsection (3) allows limi-
tations on consequential damages absent unconscionability. 128 The court
noted that one of the purposes of subsection (3) was to allow merchants
to allocate business risks, a purpose which is concomitant with the gen-
eral UCC philosophy of contractual freedom in commercial transactions.
Hence, the court reasoned that to read subsection (2) so expansively as to
govern limitations on consequential damages would abridge this freedom
provided for in the UCC, and in section 2-719 specifically.129
A similar viewpoint is also held by the Third Circuit. In Chatlos
Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,130 the court stated that in
deciding the effect which a failure of a limited remedy has on a conse-
quential damages limitation, "the better reasoned approach is to treat the
consequential damage disclaimer as an independent provision, valid un-
less unconscionable."13 1 The court reasoned that a limited remedy provi-
sion and a consequential damages limitation are two discrete ways of
limiting recovery in the event of a breach. 132 Further, the Third Circuit
noted that the UCC tests each by a different standard: The limited rem-
edy provision is enforceable unless it fails of its essential purpose while
the consequential damages limitation is valid unless found uncon-
scionable.
133
The foregoing decisions suggest that in S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith
International, Inc. ,134 the Ninth Circuit also aligned itself with this more
liberal approach. Both the Sixth and Third Circuits, in stating that the
better approach to the section 2-719 problem was to allow a consequen-
tial damages limitation to stand unless found unconscionable, cited the
126. Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 1086 (footnote omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Ninth Circuit's Wilson opinion.135
In Wilson, the Ninth Circuit found that the limited repair warranty
had failed of its essential purpose when the seller was unable to cure
substantial defects that existed in the goods.' 36 The court held that
although section 2-719 states that when there has been a failure of essen-
tial purpose, remedies "may be had as provided in this Code," it does not
follow that a bar to recovery of consequential damages should also be
eliminated.
137
C. The Ninth Circuit's 1978 Wilson Decision: Arguably a Mid-Line
Approach to the Section 2-719 Problem
Although at first glance it appears that Wilson is in concert with the
more liberal approach outlined above, when more carefully examined,
the decision arguably falls somewhere between the two extreme posi-
tions. However, it is obvious from the Ninth Circuit's recent decisions
38
that the court is either unaware of the ramifications of its Wilson decision
or is simply retreating from that decision without acknowledging or rec-
ognizing such retreat.
The Wilson court, in holding that the failure of the limited remedy
did not require permitting the recovery of consequential damages, relied
on the characteristics of the contract in reaching its conclusion.
Parties of relatively equal bargaining power negotiated an
allocation of their risks of loss. Consequential damages were
assigned to the buyer, Wilson. The machine was a complex
piece of equipment designed for the buyer's purposes. The
seller Smith did not ignore his obligation to repair; he simply
was unable to perform it. This is not enough to require that the
seller absorb losses the buyer plainly agreed to bear. Risk shift-
ing is socially expensive and should not be undertaken in the
absence of a good reason. An even better reason is required
when to so shift is contrary to a contract freely negotiated. The
default of the seller is not so total and fundamental as to require
that its consequential damage limitation be expunged from the
contract. 1
39
135. See Lewis Refrigeration, 709 F.2d at 434 & n.10; Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1086 n.3.
136. Wilson, 587 F.2d at 1375.
137. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Wilson, see infra notes 138-44 and accompany-
ing text.
138. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Milgard Tempering,
Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985); Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp.,
747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Wilson, 587 F.2d at 1375.
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1. A "total and fundamental" breach: the additional
element of willfulness
An analytical examination of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wilson
reveals more than the words appear to convey. Specifically, this Note
suggests that the Wilson court added an element of willfulness to its test
for determining when a limitation on consequential damages should be
allowed to stand in the face of a failure of a limited remedy. Although
the court did not expressly require willfulness, it stated that when a
seller's breach is "so total and fundamental" the consequential damage
limitation shall be expunged from the contract.1" However, the court
did not define what it meant by "total and fundamental." Taken literally,
it is arguable that total and fundamental means the same thing as failure
of essential purpose. Thus, "total" in essence means "failure" and "fun-
damental" in essence means "essential." But, the court obviously meant
something more by its use of the language because the court held the
consequential damages limitation enforceable, notwithstanding the fail-
ure of the limited remedy. If "total and fundamental" did not have a
meaning independent from that of "failure of essential purpose" then the
limitation would have been invalidated, and recovery of consequential
damages allowed.
In allowing the limitation to stand, the Ninth Circuit in Wilson rea-
soned that the "default of the seller [was] not so total and fundamental as
to require that its consequential damage limitation be expunged from the
contract." '14 1 The determining factor in the court's conclusion appears to
have been that the seller did not willfully and arbitrarily refuse to repair
the goods. "The seller Smith did not ignore his obligation to repair; he
simply was unable to perform it. This is not enough to require that the
seller absorb losses the buyer plainly agreed to bear."
142
This additional factor of willfulness can be seen in a recent Ninth
Circuit case. In Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp.,43 the court, in holding
the consequential damages limitation unenforceable, stated that the
seller, Fruehauf, arbitrarily declined to make the necessary repairs of its
improperly manufactured goods and unreasonably refused to live up to
its contractual promises. 1" The Fiorito court went on to emphasize the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The Wilson court was also influenced by the fact that the parties had relatively
equal bargaining power. However, this factor arguably goes to the notion of conscionability
versus unconscionability- had the court found coercion or oppressiveness in the bargaining
process, it would have invalidated the limitation based on unconscionability.
143. 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 1313.
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distinguishing factors between Wilson and the case at hand: "In Wilson,
the court found that the ... seller 'did not ignore his obligation to repair;
he was simply unable to perform it.' . . . [That] factor is [not] present
here."
145
2. RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.: a retreat from Wilson
In RRX, the Ninth Circuit continued its use of the words "total and
fundamental." However, the willfulness element suddenly disappeared.
The RRX court did not overrule Wilson but in fact relied on Wilson as its
principal authority. 46 The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court
"properly found the default of the seller so total and fundamental that its
consequential damages limitation was expunged from the contract."'
47
Curiously, however, the district court never made such a finding. a4 No-
where in the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
was anything stated about the seller's breach being so total and funda-
mental that the limitation should be expunged from the contract."49 Fur-
ther, the Ninth Circuit offered no reasoning of its own for such a
conclusion, nor did it refer to the district court's ruling for support) 50
The RRX court also ignored the reasoning employed in Wilson. The
Wilson court was heavily influenced by the fact that the seller did not
willfully refuse to repair, but rather that he was unable to do so.' Simi-
larly, in RRX, the seller, Lab-Con, did not arbitrarily refuse to repair,
but instead was simply unable to do so. The district court acknowledged
this in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
The loss of two key personnel prevented defendants from carry-
ing out their obligations. At the time the representations were
made, these two people were with the defendant company. De-
fendant could not anticipate that these two people would be
leaving the defendant company. At the time of the consumma-
tion of the agreement, the representations made were within the
capacity of the company to carry out. Thus, the company's
failure to fulfill the contract was caused by the loss of key per-
sonnel after the contract was made. As a result, defendant
145. Id. at 1314.
146. 772 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
147. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
148. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772
F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
149. Id.
150. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
151. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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company was understaffed and deficient in cash flow. 152
However, in RX, the Ninth Circuit apparently ignored the individual
facts before it, as well as the precedent of Wilson, in favor of reliance on
conclusionary reasoning. Had the Ninth Circuit examined the facts in
RRX more closely, it would have seen, as Judge Norris did,'5 3 that they
were curiously similar to the facts in Wilson.
In RRX, the Ninth Circuit relied on two other recent Ninth Circuit
cases, Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America'54 and Fiorito
Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp.,"' in affirming the district court's decision.
56
However, the RRX court failed to recognize the fact that Fiorito involved
a seller who arbitrarily and intentionally refused to repair the defective
goods, not a seller who was unable to do so.'57 Further, in Milgard the
court merely reversed a summary judgment granted to the seller. The
court remanded the case to the district court for a more detailed exami-
nation of the circumstances surrounding the breach so as to enable the
court to properly determine the validity of the consequential damages
limitation.'58 Although the Ninth Circuit stated in RRX that these
cases, as well as Wilson, stand for the principle that "'[e]ach case must
stand on its own facts,' "159 the court either failed to examine the facts in
RRX or it failed to give any substantive reasoning for its decision.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be retreating from its earlier decision
in Wilson. Although it stated that a case-by-case approach should be
utilized in determining the validity of consequential damages limitations,
the Ninth Circuit is apparently opting for the more literal and stringent
approach when dealing with such cases: a failure of essential purpose
leads to the invalidity of a limitation on consequential damages. How-
ever, if this is not true, and a case-by-case approach is still the standard
to apply, such an approach surely was not evident from the majority's
vague decision in RRX.
If the Ninth Circuit is not retreating from its Wilson decision, then
it should explicitly define what is meant by the language "total and fun-
damental." In so doing, the Ninth Circuit would provide other courts
and the contracting public with some guidelines regarding the circum-
152. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 19, at 9-10.
153. RRX, 772 F.2d at 551 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985).
155. 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
156. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547.
157. Fiorito, 747 F.2d at 1313.
158. Milgard, 761 F.2d at 557-58.
159. RRX, 772 F.2d at 547 (quoting S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, 587 F.2d 1363, 1376
(9th Cir. 1978)).
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stances which will constitute a total and fundamental breach and pre-
cisely what it is that will invalidate a consequential damages limitation.
If the court of appeals is retreating from its Wilson decision and
intends to return to the section 2-719 "literal approach," then it should
clearly state such an intent. Article II of the UCC was written to inform
parties of their contractual obligations and rights, and to create some
degree of certainty in the area of contract law. The court's chameleon-
like approach to section 2-719 is certainly not helpful to contracting par-
ties who attempt to follow the UCC. This is not to suggest that laws or
interpretation of laws should remain static. However, this Note suggests
that courts stop tapdancing around the issue of what effect the failure of
a limited remedy provision has on consequential damages limitations and
attempt to squarely face the issue. Contract law is based on rewarding
the expectations of parties. Unfortunately, after RRX, the only certainty
the contracting public can expect is uncertainty and inconsistency in de-
cisions regarding section 2-719.
D. A Mid-Line Approach Should be Adopted by Courts in Determining
the Effect of a Failure of a Limited Remedy on a
Consequential Damages Limitation
The vagueness that has plagued section 2-719 is more harmful than
both the literal approach, which invalidates all consequential damages
limitations when there has been a failure of a limited remedy, and the
liberal approach, which consistently allows the limitation to stand absent
unconscionability. For that reason a mid-line approach, briefly discussed
above and seemingly used at one time by the Ninth Circuit, would lead
to the most equitable result in section 2-719 cases.
Rather than adhere to one of the two extreme approaches, a more
workable approach would find courts focusing on the nature of the lim-
ited remedy's failure in determining what to do with a limitation on con-
sequential damages. For example, if the failure of a limited remedy is
caused by the seller willfully and intentionally refusing to repair or re-
place the goods, then the buyer should be able to recover all damages,
including consequential. However, if the limited remedy fails despite
good faith efforts by the seller to repair or replace the goods, then the
limitation on consequential damages should be allowed to stand. The
buyer, in this situation, is not left empty handed as he or she can still
recover ordinary damages under section 2-714(2).160
This mid-line approach rewards the expectations of all parties in-
160. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978).
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volved in the transaction. On the one hand, the parties, in limiting con-
sequential damages, 61 have anticipated the possibility of a breach and
allocated the risks to meet their business needs. 62 On the other hand,
the buyer expected the seller to fulfill the limited remedy obligation of
repairing or replacing the goods. Thus, when a seller willfully refuses to
repair or replace the goods the buyer loses the benefit of the bargain. The
seller's arbitrary refusal was not part of the bargain and was not expected
or anticipated by the buyer; hence, consequential damages should be al-
lowed. In discussing "willful" failures to repair, Professor Eddy stated:
"where the bulk of consequential damages flow directly from the failure
to repair and accrue during the period of wrongful refusal, what 'incen-
tive' . . . exists to compel compliance with the remedy, unless conse-
quential damages are awarded?"
163
However, the consequential damages limitation should be enforcea-
ble if the seller attempted to repair but was unable to do so. Under this
scenario, the seller tried, but was unable to fulfill its contractual obliga-
tions. Nevertheless, the buyer is not left without a remedy. The limited
remedy having failed of its essential purpose will allow the buyer to re-
cover ordinary damages as provided for by section 2-714(2). Specifically,
the buyer may recover the difference between the value of what he or she
should have received and the value of what he or she got. These damages
will compensate the buyer for his or her loss of the bargain. Moreover,
the UCC requires only that "at least minimum adequate remedies be
available."' 64 Arguably, the section 2-714(2) remedy meets this require-
ment. Further, "the apparent 'inequity' presented when defendant's re-
fusal to repair is willful is lacking where defendant has acted in good
faith."'1 65
It is extremely important to note that in this area of section 2-719,
most cases which have held consequential damages limitations unen-
forceable involved a situation where the seller willfully refused to repair
or replace the goods. 66 Conversely, most cases in which consequential
161. Although it is not stated in any of the opinions, the economics of a transaction suggest
that in return for a limitation on consequential damages, the buyer likely received some form
of compensation, either a lower contract price or more goods and services. See supra note 69
and accompanying text.
162. If there has been coercion by one party or if unequal bargaining exists between the
parties, the limitation will face the test of unconscionability by the trier of fact. See U.C.C.
§ 2-719(3) (1978).
163. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC
Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REv. 28, 85 (1977).
164. U.C.C. § 2-719 official comment 1 (1978).
165. Eddy, supra note 163, at 88.
166. See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Soo Line R.R. v.
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damages limitations were upheld have involved a seller who attempted to
repair or replace, but was simply unable to do so. 167 Although these
decisions occasionally mention the elements of willfulness versus unin-
tentional inability, courts have failed to recognize that it is the distinction
between these two elements which is truly the distinguishing factor in
determining the validity of a consequential damages limitation.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the UCC, which postulates freedom of contract as one of its
principal goals, there is much to be said for a position that leaves undis-
turbed to the greatest extent possible the allocation of business risks
made by the parties. The reluctance of some courts to allow consequent-
ial damages limitations to stand once it is found that the limited remedy
provision fails of its essential purpose does not contradict this position.
Rather, it seems predicated on the difficulty of fashioning appropriate
relief for the aggrieved party.
For this reason the adoption of a mid-line approach by the Ninth
Circuit, as well as all courts, would create some degree of certainty in an
area which is now deluged with ambiguous, confusing and contradictory
decisions. Courts have already taken the first step toward clarity in the
section 2-719 area by recognizing that the issue of whether a limited rem-
edy has failed of its essential purpose is distinct from the issue of enforce-
ability of a limitation on consequential damages.1 68 Since that time,
however, courts have not further clarified what effect the failure of a lim-
ited remedy has on consequential damages limitations.
The two extreme positions now taken by the courts 69 are simply not
necessary in light of this equitable mid-line approach. Each case will still
be determined on its individual facts, yet the real and much simpler issue
to be resolved by the trier of fact will be whether the seller willfully re-
fused to repair or replace the goods or whether the seller attempted to
repair or replace but was simply unable to do so. Once that determina-
Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th
Cir. 1971); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. I11. 1970);
Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
167. See Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d
427 (6th Cir. 1983); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980); AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978); S.M.
Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); County Asphalt, Inc. v.
Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971); V-M Corp. v. Bernhard Distrib.
Co., 447 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1971).
168. Eddy, supra note 163, at 92.
169. See supra notes 110-33 and accompanying text.
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tion is made, the court's decision regarding the validity of the conse-
quential damages limitation will easily and necessarily follow. A willful
refusal to repair or replace should automatically render the limitation on
consequential damages unenforceable and all UCC remedies would then
be available, including consequential damages. If the failure to repair
results instead from the seller's unintentional inability to do so, then the
consequential damages limitation should be enforceable. The buyer is
entitled to section 2-714(2) damages, but the buyer is not entitled to con-
sequential damages as those have been properly excluded as provided by
the UCC.1
70
In conclusion, it is important to note that even if a consequential
damages limitation is held enforceable under the above approach, it will
still be subject to the test of unconscionability. Accordingly, though a
court may find the limitation valid because the breach of the seller was
not willful, the consequential damages limitation may nevertheless fail to
pass muster under subsection (3) of section 2-719.
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